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I. INTRODUCTION
In Liberia v. Bickford,' a U.S. district court held that the Interim
Government for National Unity of the Republic of Liberia, which was
not formally recognized by the United States, had standing to represent
the Republic of Liberia in an action to recover funds placed with legal
counsel in the United States by a state-owned Liberian corporation.
The court so held by relying upon a Statement of Interest submitted by
the U.S. Department of State declaring that "it would be consistent
with the foreign policy interests of the United States for this Court to
confer standing upon the Interim Government ...."' A rival organiza-
tion claiming sovereignty, the National Patriotic Reconstruction As-
sembly Government (NPRAG), moved to intervene, but the court de-
nied its motion.3 The court noted that the Department of State was
1. 787 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
2. Id. at 400.
3. Id. at 401.
(113)
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aware of NPRAG's claim but did not mention this claim in its
Statement.4
The decision is consistent with precedent, as the judiciary gener-
ally takes a significant amount of guidance from the executive branch
in foreign affairs matters. Nevertheless, the judiciary's complete defer-
ence to the executive on the type of purely jurisdictional matter fea-
tured in this case (i.e. whether or not a particular party has standing)
is tantamount to allowing the executive branch to determine the out-
come of cases even before those cases are litigated.
In most matters, the jurisdiction of the federal courts is the prov-
ince of Congress, 5 while the executive's role is limited to its present-
ment privilege and veto power over enabling legislation.' When, how-
ever, the issue involves a foreign national, the executive has been
allowed virtually unfettered discretion to decide who does and does not
have standing.7
This Note examines the Liberia case in the context of older recog-
nition decisions and more recent cases of a similar nature. It then ex-
amines this case as a separation of powers issue. Next, it discusses rec-
ognition and standing practice in the United Kingdom and recommends
that the executive and judicial branches of U.S. government resolve to
emulate British practice.
II. THE CASE
A. The Facts
Civil war in Liberia broke out in December 1989, when Charles
Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) mounted an at-
tack from the Ivory Coast.' In August 1990, several Liberian political
parties and other interested groups met in Banjul, the Gambia under
the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). 9 ECOWAS had developed a peace plan that the United
States supported,10 and an Interim Government was formed with Amos
4. id.
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2. But cf. Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue:
The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1990)
(arguing that federal jurisdiction is really determined by a "dialogue" between the
Supreme Court and Congress).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
7. See infra part IV.
8. Liberia, 787 F. Supp. at 399.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Sawyer as its President." Despite the intervention of an Economic
Community of West African States Military Observer Group, the in-
surgency grew and President Samuel Doe was killed on September 12,
1990.12
An All-Liberian National Conference composed of Liberian politi-
cal parties and interest groups, ECOWAS, the United Nations, and the
Organization of African Unity was held in the late winter of 1991.13
Significantly, NPRAG, which is associated with Charles Taylor's
NPFL, did not attend the conference 14 at which the conferees reelected
Amos Sawyer as President. 5 Since the election, President Sawyer has
been treated as a head of state by the United Nations and has met with
an Acting Secretary of State in Washington. 6 Additionally, Liberia's
counsel offered evidence that the Interim Government continued to ac-
credit Eugenia Wordsworth-Stevenson, the Doe-appointed Liberian
ambassador, as that country's representative in Washington. 17 The
United States continued to accept her as such. 18
Before the civil war, the state-owned Liberian Mining Corporation
(LIMINCO) retained Bickford as legal counsel in the United States. 19
The Interim Government alleged that Bickford received certain proper-
ties on behalf of LIMINCO valued at $1,681,000.20
In February 1991, the Sawyer government initiated attempts to
recover the property held by Bickford,2 but Bickford refused to pro-
vide an accounting of the property because it did not believe that a
final determination had been made as to who properly represented the
Republic of Liberia. 22 After several unsuccessful attempts to recover
Liberia's property, the Interim Government filed suit in October
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Vital Statistics on Diplomatic Corps, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 4, 1991, at Al
(Eugenia Wordsworth-Stevenson listed as Liberian ambassador).
19. Liberia, 787 F. Supp. at 398.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 400.
22. Id. Bickford alleged that the former Finance Minister, who gave the money to
Bickford, "purportedly asserted that he retained authority over the disputed funds at
least until a new Liberian government received the formal recognition of the govern-
ments of certain enumerated countries." Id. at 399-400. The court noted that Bickford
so alleged without affidavit or exhibit. Id. at 399.
19941
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1991.23 NPRAG sought to intervene, stating that the Interim Govern-
ment was not the legitimate government of Liberia.2 4
B. Issues and Holding
The court faced two questions: did the Interim Government, which
lacked a formal declaration of recognition by the United States, have
standing to represent the Republic of Liberia in a U.S. forum, and did
NPRAG have standing to intervene?25 Notably, Bickford agreed that
the Republic of Liberia owned the funds.2 The court held that the
Interim Government did have standing to represent the Republic of Li-
beria and NPRAG did not have standing to intervene. 7
The court, while noting that the Interim Government lacked for-
mal recognition by the United States,28 followed the holding of a simi-
lar case, National Petrochemical Co. v. MIT Stolt Sheaf.2 9 In that
case, the court found that the United States had evinced a willingness
to allow the unrecognized Khomeini regime of Iran to litigate in a U.S.
forum because, inter alia, the U.S. government had stated that it would
be consistent with its foreign policy interests to allow the Iranian gov-
ernment access to U.S. courts for the purposes of that suit.30
The judge in the Liberia case was equally influenced by a State-
ment of Interest submitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517.31 At the re-
quest of the parties and the court, the U.S. government submitted a
statement on January 24, 1992, in which it approved the Interim Gov-
ernment's standing in this suit and, significantly, made no mention of
the standing of NPRAG. 32 The court, "defer[red] to the Executive
branch's statement in this matter" because it found the circumstances
similar to those in National Petrochemical.3 3
23. Id. at 400.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 401.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 860 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081 (1989).
30. Id. at 555.
31. Liberia, 787 F. Supp. at 399. See infra text accompanying note 144 for the
text of 28 U.S.C. § 517.
32. Liberia, 787 F. Supp. at 400-01.
33. Id. at 401.
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III. LEGAL CONTEXT
A. The Executive's Power to Recognize Foreign Governments and
its Effect on Standing
The President possesses the express constitutional power to appoint
ambassadors34 and to receive ambassadors.35 It is generally agreed that
the President derives from these express provisions his implied powers
to recognize or not to recognize a foreign government or state as well
as to direct the foreign affairs of the United States in general.3 6
The Supreme Court has long held that the decision to recognize a
state or government is a political decision not to be undertaken by the
judiciary, but by the political branches. 37 That decision, once made, is
binding on the courts.38 The Court has never wavered in its adherence
to these principles.3 9
Until recently, governments that were not recognized by the Presi-
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
36. In United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937), the Court took judi-
cial notice of the President's recognition of the Soviet Government, thereby validating
all of that government's acts for the purposes of that case. The Court stated that in
respect of all actions taken regarding this particular case, "the Executive had authority
to speak as the sole organ of [the U.S.] government." Id. at 330. See also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 204 cmt. a
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
Of course, Congress also has constitutionally-derived powers to influence foreign
affairs. Beyond Congress' power over the national purse, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, Con-
gress has powers via section 8 of article I. These include the power:
[t]o provide for the common Defence[;] [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations[;] [t]o establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization[;] [to] regulate the
value ... of foreign Coin[;] [t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies com-
mitted on the high Seas and Offenses against the Laws of Nations[;] [t]o
declare War, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and support Armies
[and;] [t]o provide and maintain a Navy ....
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
37. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890). Interestingly, the Court
stated that the decision "by the legislative and the executive departments bind[s] the
courts." Id. (emphasis added). The wording of the passage, especially the use of the
conjunctive "and" would seem to suggest that Congress might also play a role in the
decision-making. That issue has never been settled, probably because it has not been
raised. The recognition power, like so many other issues in foreign affairs, seems to
have devolved entirely upon the President.
38. Id.
39. See generally Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938)
(referring to the "political department," not the President); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937); and United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942).
1994]
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dent were denied access to state and federal courts.' 0 In the most im-
portant early cases, the Soviet government was consistently denied
standing to litigate in U.S. courts from the period of the Communist
Revolution of 1917 to that government's eventual recognition by the
Roosevelt Administration in 1933.1 During that period the Provisional
Government, which was in exile, was the only body recognized by the
U.S. government as the proper and lawful representative of Russia and
the other republics. 42 Courts denied access to other communist regimes
during the second half of the century as well.'
While non-recognition has precluded governments from litigating
in the United States, severance of diplomatic relations with recognized
governments has not had that effect. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino,"' the state-owned Cuban bank initiated an action for con-
version against the bankruptcy receiver of an American commodities
broker.' 5 The defendant attempted to equate the severance of diplo-
40. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 205. However, "the policy of denying an un-
recognized regime access to the courts does not extend to corporations owned by such a
regime .... " Id. cmt. a. That has not stopped litigants from trying to prevent such
wholly-owned corporations from litigating in U.S. courts. See the discussion of the
Ronair case infra notes 102, 103 for an example of such an attempt.
Regarding the states, the Court has said, "the external powers of the United
States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies." Belmont, 301 U.S.
at 331.
41. Pink, 315 U.S. at 211. "On November 16, 1933, the United States recognized
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the de jure Government of Russia ... I." d.
The Pink, Belmont, and Guaranty cases are examples of the litigation concerning own-
ership of Russian property that occurred in the aftermath of U.S. recognition.
42. See generally The Penza, 277 F. 91 (E.D.N.Y. 1921); The Rogdai 278 F. 294
(N.D. Cal. 1920); and, R.S.F.S.R. v. Cibrario, 139 N.E. 259 (N.Y. 1923). In all of
these cases, the Soviet Government had no chance to be a litigant in a U.S. court
despite the fact that it had de facto control over the territory. Contrast that with Rus-
sian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 293 F. 135 (D.C.N.Y. 1923), in which the
Ambassador representing the fallen Provisional Government did have standing to com-
mence an action.
In Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934), the
court held that a corporation wholly-owned by the Soviet Government did have stand-
ing to sue in a U.S. court because it was incorporated and operated entirely in New
York and therefore a citizen of that state. Id. at 528-29.
43. See, e.g., Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc., 556 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1977) (affirming
dismissal of suit by representatives of the recognized Republic of Vietnam (South Viet-
nam) when it ceased to exist after surrender to the unrecognized Socialist Republic of
Vietnam (North Vietnam)) and Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 478 F.2d
231 (2d Cir. 1973) (affirming denial of attempt by the German Democratic Republic
(East Germany) to intervene in a suit).
44. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
45. Id. at 406.
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matic relations with non-recognition, thus rendering the Cuban govern-
ment ineligible to sue in American courts.48 The Court stated that sev-
erance of diplomatic relations may occur for a variety of reasons and
may last for various lengths of time.' The justices refused to impute to
such an act the significance of a declaration of war, which would have
precluded Cuba from litigating in U.S. courts.' Furthermore, the
Court refused to equate a severance of diplomatic relations, a political
act with political implications, with non-recognition, a political act with
legal implications, holding that Banco Nacional did have standing to
sue.
49
It also has been held that non-recognition of a government will not
preclude citizens of the particular state from suing in a U.S. court as
long as the existence of the state as a state is recognized. In Iran
Handicraft & Carpet v. Marian International Corp.,50 a U.S. district
court allowed a citizen of Iran to maintain a suit despite the fact that
the Khomeini regime had not been recognized by the U.S. govern-
ment.5 1 The court stated that "[o]nce the United States recognizes an
entity as a sovereign state . . . a subsequent withdrawal of recognition
of that state's government does not effect a change in the underlying
recognition of the state as an international juridical entity. '52
B. Recognition Practice in General
Non-recognition of governments is considered a relatively new
phenomenon. 51 States originally used non-recognition to protect monar-
chies from the revolutionary change sweeping Europe in the 19th cen-
tury.54 As noted earlier, the United States used it to withhold recogni-
tion of communist revolutionary change in this century.55 The key to
the problem is that the recognition question arises when regimes
change under extra-constitutional circumstances. 56 When new govern-
46. Id. at 410.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 410-11. See infra notes 151-168 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Court's Act of State Doctrine holding.
50. 655 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd without opinion, 868 F.2d 1267 (2d
Cir. 1988).
51. Id. at 1281.
52. Id. Under international law, once recognition of statehood is granted, it cannot
be revoked. See, e.g., infra note 73 and accompanying text.
53. Diplomatic Relations and Recognition, 1977 DIGEST § 3, at 20.
54. Id.
55. See supra notes 42, 43 and accompanying text.
56. L. THOMAS GALLOWAY, RECOGNIZING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 3 (1978).
1994)
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ments come to power via a state's constitutionally provided mecha-
nisms, no announcement of recognition by other governments is
required. 7
In the United States, recognition is seen as an inherently political
matter.58 Others argue that norms and practices developed by the com-
munity of nations have made their way into customary international
law, thereby rendering the recognition decision a legal obligation under
certain circumstances. 9 These circumstances include the new govern-
ment's de facto control of its territory and population,6" its willingness
to comply with the country's obligations and treaties under interna-
tional law, 6' and whether it governs with the assent of the governed.
62
Though U.S. presidents have occasionally relied upon these prerequi-
sites, American recognition policy, in fact, has been inconsistent, with
executives changing theories with some rapidity.6 3
The developing nations and world powers have often differed
57. Id. This question of "constitutionality" or "legality" could be fertile territory
for scholars and polemicists alike. One writer discussing the difficulty of defining a
governmental change as legal or illegal, described the following common practice:
[A] group seeking to take over without putting the armed forces in the streets
would first persuade (with threats if necessary) the vice-president, or whoever
stood to succeed the presidency, to resign. This official would be replaced by
the person the group wished to see in power. After a suitable, but fairly short,
interval, the president would be induced to resign and the new vice-president
would succeed. The government would have been changed according to con-
stitutional procedures and without overt violence.
M.J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments Should not be Abolished, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 31, 40 (1983).
58. Foreign policy decision makers have utilized recognition in myriad ways,
depending on the political circumstances of the time and their perception of
the national interests involved in a change of government. Thus, for example,
the United States has used recognition as a political tool to support antimo-
narchical governments (under George Washington), to advance economic im-
perialism (under Theodore Roosevelt), to promote constitutional government
(under Woodrow Wilson), and to halt the spread of communism (under
Dwight Eisenhower). The practice of other states is similarly diverse.
GALLOWAY, supra note 56, at 1. See also John Foster Dulles, Our Politics Toward
Communism in China, 37 DEP'T ST. BULL., July 1957, at 93-94. (arguing that the
decision to recognize a new government is a political decision).
59. HERSH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 87-97 (1947).
60. Recognition, 1 Hackworth DIGEST § 33, at 175.
61. Recognition, 2 Whiteman DIGEST § 4, at 73.
62. Id.
63. GALLOWAY, supra note 56. This is essentially the thesis of the whole book.
According to another scholar, the British honored the legal obligation principles with
considerable consistency. Colin Warbrick, The New British Policy on Recognition of
Governments, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 568, 570 (1981).
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sharply in their attitudes about recognition practice. Developing nations
argue that recognition practice is wrongly used to extract promises that
intrude upon their sovereignty.64 They argue that recognition should be
granted automatically once effective control has been established by a
regime."' Developed nations argue that the recognition decision is dis-
cretionary and that they can impose any conditions they wish.66 This
conflict led to two important developments.
The first development was the 1930 announcement by Mexican
Foreign Minister Genaro Estrada that the Mexican government would
confine itself to maintenance or withdrawal of diplomatic relations af-
ter a revolution in a neighboring state.67 Foreign Minister Estrada
stated that recognition of governments
is an insulting practice and one which, in addition to the fact
that it offends the sovereignty of other nations, implies that
judgment of some sort may be passed upon the internal affairs
of those nations by other governments, inasmuch as the latter
assume, in effect, an attitude of criticism, when they decide fa-
vorably or unfavorably, as to the legal qualifications of foreign
regimes. 8
The second development was the 1933 Montevideo Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States69 which is often cited as the model for
international recognition practice.7 0 The Convention was signed by
most states in North, South and Central America and its purpose was
to end intervention by nations in the affairs of neighboring states. 71 The
most important contribution of the Convention is its definition of state-
hood: "The state as a person of international law should possess the
following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined terri-
tory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the
other states. ' '72 Recognition of statehood, once granted, is "uncondi-
64. GALLOWAY, supra, note 56, at 2.
65. Id.
66. 1944 DIGEST, vol. 2, at 5-6.
67. Estrada Doctrine of Recognition, 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 203 (Supp. 1931).
68. Id.
69. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the Seventh Inter-
national Conference of American States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097 [hereinafter
Montevideo Convention].
70. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT supra note 36, § 201 cmt. a. See also infra part V.B.
71. Montevideo Convention, supra note 69, art. 8, 49 Stat. at 3100.
72. Id. art. 1, 49 Stat. at 3100.
1994]
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tional and irrevocable."73 Recognition of a state may also be express or
tacit.7 ' Additionally, states should not recognize states or governments
that have effected control by force.75 It is clear from the structure of
the Convention that states are not required to recognize other states or
governments and that states are not required to maintain diplomatic
relations with other states and governments.
76
The signers of the Montevideo Convention understood that recog-
nition was a political act, but they added a duty to treat even an unrec-
ognized government as the government in fact or an unrecognized state
as a state in fact. 77 There is, however, no obligation to allow unrecog-
nized states and governments access to domestic courts.78
The United States, therefore, has few real obligations under inter-
national law. While not recognizing an entity that clearly is a state is
considered bad form, there is no law compelling recognition, only law
stating that the state must nevertheless be treated as a state. Recently,
States have responded to the recognition problem by doing away with
the practice of formally recognizing new governments.
C. Recent Recognition Practice
In 1980, the Carter Administration announced that the United
States would no longer recognize new governments, effectively making
official a practice that had begun in the 1970s.
In recent years, U.S. practice has been to deemphasize and
avoid the use of recognition in cases of changes of governments
and to concern ourselves with the question of whether we wish
to have diplomatic relations with the new governments.
The Administration's policy is that establishment of rela-
tions does not involve approval or disapproval but merely dem-
73. Id. art. 6, 49 Stat. at 3100.
74. Id. art. 7, 49 Stat. at 3100.
75. Id. art. 11, 49 Stat. at 3101. See also RESTATEMENT supra note 36, § 203,
which notes that states may not recognize states or governments that effect control in
violation of the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Charter does not specifi-
cally address the issue of recognition of governments. The Charter, however, calls for
Members to respect the territorial integrity of other members. U.N. CHARTER art. 2,
1, 3, 4. The Charter also mandates that Member States refrain from assisting States
that violate the Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 11 5.
76. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 203.
77. Montevideo Convention, supra note 69, art. 3, 49 Stat. at 3100. See also RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 36, § 203 cmt. b.
78. Montevideo Convention, supra note 69, art. 3, 49 Stat. at 3100. See also RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 36, § 203 cmt. b.
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onstrates a willingness on our part to conduct our affairs with
other governments directly.7 9
This declaration, which is similar to the Estrada Doctrine, 0 has
presented an entirely new challenge for courts. The statement does not
hint at how courts are expected to handle future questions regarding
unrecognized states and thus has led to the troubling decisions dis-
cussed in this Note.81
Succeeding administrations appear to have adhered to the Carter
policy. Though President Clinton recently announced the recognition of
the "Government of Angola,"" 2 the history of U.S.-Angola relations
demonstrates that the United States had never formally recognized the
existence of Angola as a state.8 3 Indeed, while the United States con-
79. Diplomatic Relations and Recognition, 1977 DIGEST § 3, at 20.
80. See supra notes 67, 68 and accompanying text.
81. In a similar announcement, the British government stated that it's attitude
toward a new government would have to be inferred from the nature of its dealings
with that government. See infra notes 181-184 and accompanying text. Not all com-
mentators are totally sanguine about the way British courts have handled this chal-
lenge. See M.J. Dixon, Recent Developments in United Kingdom Practice Concerning
Recognition of States and Governments, 22 INT'L LAW. 555, 558 (1988). Dixon criti-
cizes the Court of Appeal's decision in Gur Corp. v. Trust Bank of Africa Ltd, 3
W.L.R. 583, 587 (1986), discussed in some detail at infra part V.A.
82. U.S. Recognition of Angolan Government, 4 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, May 24,
1993, at 375. The President's statement was interesting for many reasons, not the least
of which was his statement that he "tried to use the possibility of U.S. recognition as a
leverage toward promoting an end to the civil war." Id. See the discussion at supra
notes 55-64 about the use of recognition as a coercive tool of foreign policy and various
attitudes about this use.
83. See The United States and Angola, 1974 - 88: A Chronology, 89 DEP'T ST.
BULL., Feb. 1989, at 16 [hereinafter Angola Chronology]. On November 11, 1975, two
independent republics were declared on the soil of an Angola recently freed from Por-
tuguese rule. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) established
the People's Republic of Angola with its capital in Luanda, while the National Front
for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Indepen-
dence of Angola (UNITA) established separate spheres of influence in what they called
the People's Democratic Republic of Angola with its capital at Huambo. Id. at 17.
Secretary of State Kissinger announced that the United States would not recognize the
MPLA. Id. More significantly, the United States did not recognize the UNITA regime
at Huambo. See id.
The conflict in Angola eventually became a proxy for the Cold War and the
United States eventually sided with UNITA. On November 22, 1976, the United
States abstained on a U.N. Security Council Resolution recommending that the Gen-
eral Assembly admit Angola to membership in the United Nations. On this date the
U.S. representative to the United Nations expressed the view that Angola was not yet
an independent country.
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tinues to recognize new states,8 4 the United States has not declared its
recognition of any new governments. This problem of recognition and
jurisdiction is influenced by the fact that though all three branches of
government can impact foreign affairs, the real power is exercised by
the president and the executive branch.
D. The Executive's Foreign Affairs Powers
The Supreme Court held in the landmark Curtiss-Wright case
that the President has an implied power to conduct the foreign rela-
tions of the United States.85 The Court upheld a statute which empow-
ered the President to invoke and revoke at his discretion an embargo of
arms to warring parties in South America,8 rejecting an argument
"that Congress abdicated its essential functions and delegated them to
We still have serious doubts about the true independence of the current Ango-
lan Government. It is hard to reconcile the presence of a massive contingent
of Cuban troops with the claim that Angola enjoys truly independent status.
The Angolan government exercises only tenuous control over much of Angola
that still resists domination by the regime in Luanda. The fact that it depends
heavily on Cuban forces for the maintenance of its security casts doubt on the
degree of popular support which it can command within the country.
U.S. Abstains on Application of Angola for U.N. Membership, 75 DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Dec. 20, 1976, at 742. The representative said that the United States abstained rather
than oppose the application "out of respect for the sentiments expressed by our African
friends." Id. Of course, the recognition granted the Angolan Government by President
Clinton came about only after the end of the Cold War and the exit of Cuban troops
from Angola.
It is also important to note that as early as 1978, the Carter Administration was
using the nomenclature of the no "recognition of governments" policy. On June 26,
1978, the President said that there were no plans to "normalize" relations with Angola.
Angola Chronology, at 18.
84. See U.S. Recognition of Former Yugoslav Republics, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH,
Apr. 13, 1992, at 287 ("The United States recognizes Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia,
and Slovenia as sovereign and independent states."); U.S. Recognizes Czech and
Slovak Republics, 4 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Jan. 18, 1993, at 35 ("The President recog-
nized the new Czech and Slovak Republics . . . ."); U.S. Recognition of Eritrea, 4
DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, May 3, 1993, at 320 ("[O]ur consulate in Asmara informed the
authorities that we recognized Eritrea as an independent state.").
In each of the announcements, the next phrase or sentence spoke of the U.S. desire
to establish full diplomatic relations with the new nations. These statements are dem-
onstrations of the important distinctions between recognition and diplomatic relations
that the Supreme Court drew in deciding Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964). See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text for a discussion about
this aspect of the Sabbatino decision.
85. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
86. Id. at 312-13.
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the Executive."87 In that era at the dawn of the regulatory state, the
Court justified its position by stating that there are fundamental "dif-
ferences between the powers of the federal government in respect of
foreign affairs ... and those in respect of domestic ... affairs." 88 Those
differences allow Congress greater latitude in delegating authority to
the President. 9
The Court, however, went farther than it may have needed and
stated that the President has "exclusive power .. as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations." 90 With-
out actually citing a provision of the Constitution, the Court relied on
the notion that this was the only logical way to conduct foreign affairs,
citing, inter alia, an early incident in which President Washington re-
fused to reveal to Congress details of a negotiation he was conducting
with a foreign power.91 The Court further demonstrated that since the
beginning of the Republic, Congress has passed laws in the foreign af-
fairs area "which either leave the exercise of the power to [the Presi-
dent's] unrestricted judgment or provide a standard far more general
than that which has always been considered requisite with regard to
domestic affairs. 92 The Court stated that while mere repetition does
not make such an act constitutional, such an "impressive array of legis-
lation . . . must be given unusual weight."' 93 A longstanding practice
such as this demonstrates the constitutionality of the power in the ori-
gin or history of the power involved. 9' Presidential pre-eminence in for-
87. Id. at 315. In general, the delegation doctrine has been considered dead since
the middle 1930s, J. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575,
582 (1972), but with both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia on the Court, it
may still have some life in it. For an example, see then-Justice Rehnquist's concurring
opinion in Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 672
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The Curtiss-Wright case has been introduced not
for the point it makes about delegation but to illustrate the solicitude of both Court
and Congress for the executive's prerogative in foreign affairs.
88. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 320.
91. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320-21. See also Michael J. Glennon, The Use of
Custom in Resolving Separation of Power Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984) (ar-
guing that the Supreme Court's approach to separation of powers issues has been in-
consistent as it relies alternately on the text of the Constitution, the framers' intent or
custom to arrive at the desired solution). This case has been described as "the Court's
recognition of the president's unenumerated sole-organ power." HAROLD H. KOH, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 135 (1990) (emphasis added).
92. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 324.
93. Id. at 327.
94. Id. at 328. Note the similarity between this approach and that of Justice
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eign affairs was simply taken as an article of faith by the Court.
The Curtiss-Wright case is just one of many cases that stand for
the proposition that the President is the primary actor in the realm of
foreign relations. Congress has attempted to impose its own will in this
area infrequently and with varying degrees of success?9
The challenge to the courts today is how to reconcile their tradi-
tional deference to the executive with the lack of direction provided by
the new non-recognition of governments doctrine. In earlier practice,
the executive stated explicitly whether or not it recognized a state or
Frankfurter in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593-614
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He wrote: "[A] systemic, unbroken executive
practice long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned..
may be treated as a gloss on 'executive power.' " Id. at 610-11.
It should be noted that for all the hue and cry about the "Imperial Presidency"
usurping Congressional power in the realm of foreign affairs, the Congress itself is
largely responsible for this turn of events. See Philip R. Trimble, The President's For-
eign Affairs Powers, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 39 (Louis
Henkin et al. eds., 1990). The author argues that for various reasons, Congress has
chosen to delegate considerable power to the executive in the foreign affairs area (the
Curtiss-Wright case is a prime example). He notes that Congress does have the poten-
tial to exercise considerable power, by virtue of its power to legislate and its power over
the budget. See also supra note 36 for an enumeration of Congress' constitutionally-
derived foreign affairs powers.
95. See the saga of Congressional attempts to limit U.S. involvement in Angola
via the Tunney and Clark Amendments. Angola Chronology, supra note 83, at 17-18
(entries for the following dates: Dec. 19, 1975; Dec. 20, 1975; Jan. 27, 1976; June 30,
1976; May 25, 1978; June 26, 1978; Dec. 16, 1980; Mar. 19, 1981; and May 19,
1981.) Even President Carter was concerned about the Amendment's effect on the
President's "capacity to act in the national interest." Id. (entry for May 25, 1978).
Congress also has made it clear that it would like to be informed by the Secretary
of State when the executive commits the United States to any international agree-
ments. See 1 U.S.C. § 112b (1988) (calling upon the Secretary of State to transmit to
Congress the text of any such agreement no later than sixty days after it has come into
force). Even here, the Congress was solicitous of executive concerns for secrecy:
[A]ny such agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the
opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United
States shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted [to
the relevant Congressional committees] under an appropriate injunction of se-
crecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President.
Id. § l12b(a).
Of course, Congress' attempt to place limits on President Reagan's efforts to un-
seat the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua by controlling the expenditure of funds,
led the administration to look to outside sources of funding for its Contra allies. Frank
G. Colella, Beyond Institutional Competence: Congressional Efforts to Legislate
United States Policy Toward Nicaragua: The Boland Amendments, 54 BROOK. L.
REV. 131, 133-34 (1988).
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government."6 Once the Supreme Court decided that it was the execu-
tive's prerogative to make these decisions, it was relatively easy to de-
cide each case. Certainly the Court added nuances to the process as in
Sabbatino,9 7 but even refinements like this deviated little from the cut
and dry conceptions of recognition and non-recognition. Under the new
doctrine, there are no cut and dry situations. The courts have re-
sponded by allowing the executive even greater influence, creating in-
roads into the very jurisdiction of the courts.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Standing of Unrecognized Foreign Governments
Recent decisions featuring litigation by unrecognized foreign re-
gimes98 (or their wholly-owned corporations) have several common ele-
ments. They involve countries in which change was brought about by
unconstitutional measures or violence, and they involve Statements of
Interest by the United States government which were generally disposi-
tive. Each case suffers from some conceptual weakness. The most glar-
ing weakness is that each court could have reached the same result
without seeking Department of State input on whether it would be in
the best interests of the United States to allow the regime in question
to litigate in a U.S. court.
Foreign governments and corporations assert their standing via 28
U.S.C. § 1332 which confers diversity jurisdiction on the federal dis-
trict courts.99 Standing is granted to foreign states, and foreign citizens
96. See supra part III.B.
97. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (severance of
diplomatic relations a with recognized country is not enough to deny standing to that
country). See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
98. Of course, pursuant to the non-recognition doctrine, it is technically meaning-
less to state that a government has been recognized or not recognized by the U.S.
government. However, because the cases discussed in the following sections featured
challenges to the standing of "non-recognized" governments, it is necessary to continue
using these terms.
99. The statute states:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil matters
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of $50,000 exclusive of in-
terests and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a
foreign state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plain-
tiff and citizens of a State or different States.
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as they are defined elsewhere in the title.1°0 The statute does not spec-
ify that the government must be recognized by the United States; that
has been left up to case law.10 1
Since the U.S. government stopped explicitly recognizing govern-
ments, the courts have begun to develop other ways to determine
whether certain regimes have standing to litigate here. They have con-
sistently relied on several factors: the objective behavior of the United
States toward the regime in question; the continuing existence of agree-
ments and treaties between the United States and the government in
question; and the explicitly stated desires of the executive branch. The
courts have relied most heavily on the third of these factors.
In Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair, Inc.,102 a district
court declined to dismiss a suit brought by a corporation wholly-owned
by the People's Republic of Angola, a country with which the United
States maintained no diplomatic relations at the time. 103 The court
cited two facts to support its holding. First, the Commerce Depart-
ment, in consultation with the State Department, allowed the defend-
ant American corporation to contract with the Angolan corporation.0 4
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988).
See Iran Handicraft & Carpet v. Marjan Int'l. Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), affd without opinion, 868 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988), discussed at supra notes
50-52, for a construction of this statute when the United States has recognized the
state as an international juridical entity, but does not recognize the particular
government.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1988) states that a "foreign state ... includes a politi-
cal subdivision of a foreign state, or an agency or an instrumentality of a foreign state
as defined in subsection (b)." Subsection (b) states:
An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporation, or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States ... nor
created under the laws of any third country.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
101. See supra part III.
102. 544 F. Supp. 858 (D.Del. 1982).
103. Id. at 859. Curiously, neither the court nor the Department of State drew a
distinction between diplomatic relations and recognition. Yet the Supreme Court in the
Sabbatino case made much of this distinction. See supra notes 44-49 and accompany-
ing discussion. One of the circumstances that makes this area of law so difficult is this
kind of imprecision and lack of rigor on the part of the courts.
President Clinton has now recognized the Republic of Angola. See supra note 82
and accompanying text.
104. Id. at 860. Interestingly, the U.S. position on economic relations with Angola
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Permission to contract, according to the court, "could in itself be con-
sidered a grant of standing to litigate any claim arising out of that
transaction in the courts of the United States. 10 5 Second, the State
Department issued a letter to Angola's counsel stating that while the
United States did not maintain diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of Angola, allowing the Angolan government to pursue its
claim in U.S. courts "would be consistent with the foreign policy inter-
ests of the United States." 10 6 The court stated that by relying on the
actions and words of the executive to confer jurisdiction on this unrec-
ognized government, it was giving proper effect to the executive
branch's political judgments." '
Counsel for Angola argued that the absence of the word "recogni-
tion" from the State Department's letter signalled an "abandonment of
the recognition dichotomy as a vehicle for exerting pressure on foreign
governments."'108 Interestingly, the court never addressed this assertion.
If it had, the court might have had to agree for one very important
reason-the United States had never formally recognized the existence
of a state of Angola. If the court had addressed the fact that Angola
had never been recognized by the United States as a state,10 9 it would
have been bound to dismiss the suit for lack of standing because stand-
ing is granted to foreign states and their citizens. 1 0
On the other hand, the Montevideo Convention states quite explic-
itly that recognition of a state can be express or tacit."' "The latter
results from any act which implies the intention of recognizing the new
state.""' 2 It is arguable that by its various actions over the years, par-
ticularly allowing American corporations to trade with Angola," 3 the
hardened later during the Reagan Administration. A State Department spokesman was
quoted as saying that economic policy toward Angola was "to deny, pending an
achievement of a negotiated settlement, all U.S. exports to Angola with military use
and to not support ... Angola's ability to earn foreign currency and thus fund its war
against UNITA." Angola Chronology, supra note 83, at 20. Later when the Angolan
peace process appeared to be succeeding, the State Department once again favored
increased U.S. economic ties with Angola. See Potential for US Private Sector Activity
in Angola, 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Mar. 9, 1992, at 198.
105. Ronair, 554 F. Supp. at 863.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 861.
109. See supra note 83 and accompanying text for an extended discussion of U.S.
relations with Angola.
110. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4).
111. Montevideo Convention, supra note 69, art. 7, 49 Stat. at 3100.
112. Id.
113. See Ronair, 544 F. Supp. at 861. See also discussion supra note 104.
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United States tacitly recognized Angola.114 The court, therefore, could
have ended its inquiry once it discovered that the Commerce Depart-
ment had sanctioned the contract. 115 There was no need to depend on
the letter from the State Department.
In its opinion for National Petrochemical Co. v. MIT Stolt
Sheaf,"'6 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the first
court to consider the new non-recognition policy." 7 The court held that
non-recognition of the Khomeini government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran was not an appropriate criterion by which to decide whether a
corporation wholly-owned by that government could have access to
U.S. courts." 8 The court stated that acts of the U.S. government "sug-
gest that the Executive Branch has evinced an implicit willingness to
permit . . . Iran to avail itself of a federal forum."'1 9 Such acts in-
cluded being a party to the Algerian Accords by which the United
States and Iran settled the hostage crisis; being a party to the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal at the Hague, which as of the date of the case,
continued to adjudicate disputes between the two countries; and not
abrogating a 1955 treaty of friendship.2 0 Individually, none of these
acts would suffice, but taken together, they demonstrate the necessary
"willingness" on the part of the United States.' 2 ' The court, however,
was finally convinced when the United States submitted a Statement of
Interest in the form of an amicus brief on appeal, stating the position
of the executive that the Iranians should be allowed access to the U.S.
court to pursue their suit.'2 2
Interestingly, the court did not actually state which of these ele-
114. Note that in the statement supra note 83, the U.S. representative to the
United Nations referred to the MPLA as the "current Angolan Government." The
Angola Chronology is replete with references to U.S. government contacts with the
pre-recognition MPLA-dominated Angolan Government. See, e.g., Angola Chronology,
supra note 83 at 18 (entry for June 20, 1978); Angola Chronology, supra note 83 at 19
(entry for Jan. 26, 1983).
115. Indeed, the court did state that "this could in itself be considered a grant of
standing to litigate any claim arising out of that transaction in the courts of the United
States." Ronair, 544 F. Supp. at 863. The United States could hardly be said to speak
with "one voice" if the State Department had said that it would not be in the best
interests of the United States to allow Angola to litigate in the United States while the
Commerce Department was sanctioning contracts.
116. 860 F.2d 551, 554 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081 (1989).
117. Id. at 554.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 555.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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ments was dispositive, nor whether one would have sufficed without the
other, though it noted the Statement of Interest last. Furthermore, the
court seemed to assume that if the Statement had been filed with the
lower court judge (who had dismissed National Petrochemical's case
with prejudice),' 23 he might have ruled otherwise. 12 Taken together
these two facts seem to indicate that it was the Statement of Interest
that was and always would have been dispositive. The court also stated
that this ruling was consistent with preserving the President's preemi-
nence in foreign affairs. The President "must have the latitude to per-
mit a foreign nation access to U.S. courts, even if that nation is not
formally recognized by the U.S. government.' 25 This would seem to
indicate that Presidential expressions were dispositive. In the penulti-
mate paragraph of the opinion, however, the court presents the various
elements as acting in a continuum, demonstrative acts flowing natu-
rally, almost predictably into assertions of national preference. 126
The court also brushed aside appellee's contention that this ruling
would encourage arbitrary and unpredictable government pronounce-
ments on the status of foreign governments,'127 stating that this was not
such a case.'28 However, the court indicated that there could be cir-
cumstances under which the government's actions could be seen as ar-
bitrary. Examples of such behavior would be prohibiting a recognized
government from bringing a suit, or allowing some suits by an unrecog-
nized government and not allowing others. 9 One interesting point is
that the court never attempted to explain why the United States en-
tered its amicus brief. It is difficult to fathom how the court can deter-
mine that the United States is not acting arbitrarily if it does not at-
tempt to understand why the United States took a position in the case.
123. Id. at 553.
124. See id. at 555.
125. Id. The tone of this passage may reflect discomfort with the abandonment of
the recognition/non-recognition dichotomy. Also, the court's use of words is careless.
There was no doubt that Iran existed as a "nation" and was recognized as such. See
Iran Handicraft & Carpet v. Marjan Int'l Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
afid without opinion, 868 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988), discussed supra notes 50-52 and
accompanying text.
126. National Petrochemical, 860 F.2d at 555-56.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 556.
129. Id. In the denouement to the story, National Petrochemical's suit was even-
tually dismissed by the district court. National Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf,
722 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). National Petrochemical was suing, ironically, a Li-
berian shipper for conversion after National Petrochemical's failed attempt to export
certain chemicals from the United States to Iran in contravention of U.S. law. Id. The
court dismissed the case because of this illegality. Id. at 55.
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In the Liberia case, the court found that relevant circumstances
were similar to those in National Petrochemical, rendering it reasona-
ble to follow National Petrochemical."'0 It is difficult to see the similar-
ities. In explaining the Liberia holding, the judge did not mention
ongoing relations between Liberia and the United States, nor did he
cite any existing treaty. The only real similarity is the Statement of
Interest from the government stating that the litigants should be al-
lowed to pursue their claims."'1
One important difference is that in the National Petrochemical
case, the court explicitly noted that the United States had severed dip-
lomatic relations with Iran.13 2 By contrast, there were ongoing relations
between Liberia and the United States-the Liberian ambassador, sent
to the United States in 1986, had kept her accreditation despite the
change in government in Liberia."'3 Additionally, the United States
had apparently never taken any other action to indicate disapproval of
the Sawyer government in Liberia. In fact, the United States supported
the peace process which led to the election of Sawyer.134
In the past, litigants raised questions about the standing of a gov-
ernment to sue in U.S. courts when the United States had taken ac-
tions or made statements indicating non-recognition of a government.
The issue of recognition was properly raised in the period before the
United States recognized Soviet rule;13 5 when the United States was
dealing with an Angolan state and government that it had never recog-
nized;1 3 1 when the United States was in a Cold War with Cuba;1 37 and
when the United States had suspended diplomatic relations with
Iran. "'38 In the Liberia case, however, there was simply no reason to
assume that the United States did not recognize the Interim Govern-
ment of Liberia, and the court could have found in its favor simply
upon the continuation of diplomatic relations with that state and with-
130. Liberia v. Bickford, 787 F. Supp. 397, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
131. Compare id. at 400 ("[I1n the present case, it would be consistent with the
foreign policy interests of the United States for this Court to confer standing upon the
Interim Government .... ") with National Petrochemical, 860 F.2d at 555 ("[lit is the
position of the Executive Branch that the Iranian Government and its instrumentality
should be afforded access to our courts .... ").
132. National Petrochemical, 860 F.2d at 554.
133. Liberia, 787 F. Supp. at 399.
134. Id.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 44-49.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 116-118.
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out soliciting the Department of State's opinion on jurisdiction. 13 9 After
the Sabbatino holding in which the Supreme Court held that the sever-
ance of diplomatic relations did not preclude a recognized government
from suing in a U.S. forum,14 0 it would require an untenable leap of
logic to entertain the notion that a government with which the United
States maintains diplomatic relations did not have standing to sue in a
U.S. forum.
As judicial doctrine, the cases say very little. While all purport to
rely on objective factors by which the court can gauge the attitude of
the government, they were all, in the final analysis, determined by the
Statement of Interest of the United States, declaring that the foreign
government should be allowed to litigate in the instant case. Intuitively,
this is logical. Where the United States acts as if it wants a certain
situation to exist, it will usually also say so. The question that the
courts have not answered, and probably will not answer until faced
with it, is what they will do when the executive does one thing and says
another. It is not inconceivable that the government might one day
manifest positive behavior toward a regime and later state that it is not
in the best interests of the United States to allow the regime to sue in
its fora. This is the arbitrariness that the National Petrochemical court
mentioned but rejected as not occurring in that case.'
There is another glaring difference between the National Pe-
trochemical and Liberia cases. The Khomeini regime was in firm con-
trol of the country and governed more or less with the consent of the
governed. The same cannot be said for the Interim Government of Li-
beria. War continued to rage in that country well after this case was
decided. The obvious result is that rather than adding greater logic to
recognition practice, the United States has quite obviously gone even
further to reject well-developed international recognition standards:
that the new regime govern with the consent of the governed and that
it have control over its territory and population. 42
There is an apparent contradiction between the two preceding crit-
icisms. On the one hand, the Liberia court is criticized for making an
inquiry with the State Department into Liberia's juridical status when
none was required-Liberia should have been granted standing because
there was simply no reason to assume that the United States did not
139. The court focused exclusively on the State Department's "views on stand-
ing." See Liberia, 797 F. Supp. at 400.
140. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 412 (1964).
141. National Petrochemical Co. v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081 (1989).
142. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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recognize the Sawyer government. On the other hand, the court is criti-
cized for granting the Sawyer government standing despite the fact
that the government was not in actual control of Liberia. The contra-
dictions, however, go to the heart of the problematic nature of judicial
practice discussed in this Note: when faced with these kinds of situa-
tions, courts are avoiding their right and duty to formulate a principled
and intellectually rigorous approach to the problem in favor of simply
turning to the State Department for instructions.
B. Statements of Interest
Statements of Interest clearly played a decisive role in the Liberia
and National Petrochemical decisions. In Ronair, of course, the State-
ment of Interest actually came in the form of a letter from the State
Department to Angola's counsel, but it had the same effect.1" 3
The Statements of Interest were purportedly brought to the courts'
attention pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517 which states:
The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Jus-
tice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any State or dis-
trict in the United States to attend to the interests of the
United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States,
or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the
United States.1 44
Historically, the United States has intervened in cases that directly ef-
fect the operations of U.S. agencies. 45 However, where the foreign af-
fairs of the United States are concerned, the courts have interpreted
this statute loosely. In none of the cases discussed in this Note is there
evidence that the court asked the Department of State to point to the
nature of the governmental interest that merited the government's com-
ments. The cases demonstrate that the courts were all too anxious to
receive directions from the State Department."'
143. See Transportes Aereos de Angola v. Ronair, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 858, 861
(D.Del. 1982).
144. 28 U.S.C. § 517 (1988).
145. See, e.g., Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1976) (permitting the
United States to represent an individual who had cooperated earlier as a witness in a
related suit); Black Spotted Horse v. Else, 767 F.2d 516 (8th Cir. 1985) (involving a
suit against a federal corrections officer); and Meredith v. Van Oosterhout, 286 F.2d
216 (8th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 835 (1960) (involving a tort action against
a federal judge).
146. In Liberia, the Court requested the Statement of Interest from the State
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One of the effects of these Statements of Interest is that they have
permitted the executive branch to determine the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts. According to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, the juris-
diction of the federal courts is determined by the Congress.1 47 The ex-
ecutive's role is limited to its presentment and veto powers. With these
recent decisions, the courts have taken their traditional deference to the
executive on foreign affairs and expanded it to the point where the ex-
ecutive can determine the prevailing party in an action simply by deny-
ing standing to one party or another.1 48 As noted earlier, the courts do
not seem to know what they would do if faced with this dilemma.
Additionally, the Statements of Interest tend to dilute the effect of
the announced intention to refrain from formally recognizing new re-
gimes. What is a Statement of Interest conferring standing if not a
recognition of the regime? Such a practice effectively returns foreign
relations back to where they were before the Carter administration an-
nouncement, though now with the Legal Advisor to the Department of
State making recognition decisions rather than the President. This type
of recognition can also be used in the unseemly and "insulting" manner
in which formal recognition was supposedly used in the past: to apply
pressure to new governments.
Finally, the courts' liberal construction of 28 U.S.C. § 517 raises
significant separation of powers issues. It is not clear why the courts
have turned these statements into an executive authority to instruct the
courts on the limits of their jurisdiction. The doctrine that non-recog-
nized countries cannot sue in the United States was created by the ju-
Department. Liberia v. Bickford, 787 F. Supp. 397, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In National
Petrochemical, the government entered the litigation during the appeal, submitting an
amicus brief that was obviously decisive. National Petrochemical, 860 F.2d at 553.
Finally, the Ronair court took its directions from a letter written by the State Depart-
ment to Angola's counsel. Ronair, 544 F. Supp. at 861.
147. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
148. The judiciary has also occasionally relied on the political question doctrine to
avoid adjudicating many such cases. See, e.g., Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333
(D.D.C. 1987), in which a federal district court dismissed a challenge by 110 members
of Congress to an action by President Reagan which they claimed violated the War
Powers Act. The court held that it was a political question and feared "the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question." Id. at 340 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
But see First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan wrote that the Court should have invoked the
political question doctrine to avoid judicial review of the act of a foreign state. Id. at
788 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra part IV.C. for an extensive discussion of the
Act of State Doctrine. See infra notes 161-166 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the First National case.
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diciary" 9 and reflected a reasonable judicial decision to respect execu-
tive prerogatives. However, there was never any direct connection
between the decision not to recognize a government and any pending or
current litigation. Similarly, the courts could certainly create a new
doctrine to respond to the executive policy of not declaring the recogni-
tion of a new government. They have, however, avoided this task in
favor of asking the Department of State to resolve the problems posed
by particular current litigation. The new doctrine is: let the State De-
partment decide the case.150 There is, however, precedent for this ex-
treme form of judicial deference to the executive.
C. Act of State Doctrine
Under the Act of State Doctrine, "courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within
its own territory." 151 The Supreme Court has described that doctrine as
"a principle of decision binding on federal and state courts alike but
compelled by neither international law nor the Constitution.," 2 The
continuing vitality of the doctrine "depends on its capacity to reflect
the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political
branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign af-
fairs." 53 In short, it was a judicially created doctrine.
In Sabbatino, the Department of State expressly refused to com-
ment on the substance of the case, 1 4 but stated that its silence did not
indicate that the executive approved of the possibility that the Court
would inquire into the legality of the foreign state's act. 55 The Court
did not make such an inquiry, but interestingly, the Court also did not
comment on the propriety of a possible declaration by the executive on
the application or non-application of the Act of State Doctrine. 56
149. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 124 (1933).
150. See infra note 171 and accompanying text discussing the problem of allowing
low level government officials to make decisions that could effect the outcome of
litigation.
151. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (refusing to allow an
American citizen to sue a Venezuelan military commander in a U.S. court).
152. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964).
153. Id. at 427-28.
154. Id. at 420 n. 19.
155. Id. at 436. The defendant raised the issue when it claimed that Cuba origi-
nally expropriated the commodity (sugar) illegally, and that a U.S. court should not
give credit to this act. The Cuban government said this fell under the Act of State
Doctrine. Id. at 413.
156. In fact, the Court pointed to this as proof that the United States did not
intend to close its courts to Cuba. See id. at 411.
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The Sabbatino Court noted that an exception to the Act of State
Doctrine had been proposed a few years earlier in a federal appeals
court.157 In a series of cases involving a Jewish plaintiff whose property
was confiscated by Germany's Nazi Government, the Second Circuit
held that the acts of the German government would be immune from
action in U.S. courts, unless the Department of State ordered other-
wise.' 58 The State Department eventually issued such an order in the
form of a press release, and an exception to Act of State Doctrine,
known as the "Bernstein exception," was born. 159 The Sabbatino Court
did not address the constitutional validity of the Bernstein exception, 16 0
but the Supreme Court eventually addressed the issue in 1972.
In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,6 ' the
Department of State advised the Court "that . . .where the Executive
publicly advises the Court that the Act of State Doctrine need not be
applied, the Court should proceed to examine the legal issues raised by
the act of a foreign sovereign within its own territory as it would any
other question before it."'6 2 Justice Rehnquist, writing a plurality opin-
ion for the Court,1 63 stated that the Court should heed the direction of
the executive in this matter. 4 The plurality adopted the Bernstein ex-
ception, noting that doing so was compatible with its desire to act con-
sistently with the executive's judgments about U.S. national inter-
157. Id. at 419.
158. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.
1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947) and Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amer-
ikaanschestoomyaart-maatschappij (Chemical Bank & Trust Co., Third Party Defend-
ant), 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
159. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaanschestoomyaart-maatschappij
(Chemical Bank & Trust Co., Third Party Defendant), 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir.
1954). The letter stated in pertinent part:
The policy of the Executive, with respect to the claims asserted in the United
States for the restitution of identifiable property (or compensation in lieu
thereof) lost through force, coercion, or duress as a result of Nazi persecution
in Germany, is to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the exer-
cise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials.
160. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 436.
161. 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
162. Id. at 764.
163. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White joined Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 760.
Justice Douglas filed an opinion concurring in the result. Id. at 770. Justice Powell also
filed an opinion concurring in the judgement. Id. at 773. Justice Brennan filed a dis-
senting opinion and was joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at
776.
164. Id. at 768. "[T]he Executive Branch has expressly stated that an inflexible
application of the act of state doctrine by this Court would not serve the interests of
American foreign policy." Id. at 767.
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ests. 165 Few cases purport to follow the holding of this severely divided
Court, but it is still good law.' 60
It is difficult to assess the real jurisprudential value of the Bern-
stein exception. All of the relevant cases 16 7 involved expropriations that
were counter to international law. It might therefore be reasonable to
contend that they demonstrate a "judicial reluctance to apply the act of
state doctrine"' 68 in such cases. There are, however, other circum-
stances peculiar to the cases that should be emphasized. The original
Bernstein case involved Nazi Germany, a government that no longer
exists. All of the others involved Cuba, a country whose demonization
by American political leaders has few limits.
Nevertheless, the Act of State Doctrine has clear parallels to the
Carter administration announcement that the United States would no
longer declare the recognition (or non-recognition) of new govern-
ments. 6 9 Both doctrines focus on the U.S. desire not to make pro-
nouncements about the correctness or legality of acts that have taken
place in foreign countries. 70 Yet, as demonstrated by the Bernstein ex-
ception and the Statements of Interest, the judiciary has allowed, and
in some cases requested, the executive to provide answers that impinge
on its jurisdiction when difficult questions arise.
165. Id. at 768.
166. The Supreme Court has never overruled or clarified the holding.
Interestingly, courts applying the Bernstein exception have actually done so with-
out the actual submission of a letter from the Department of State. The original Bern-
stein case itself turned on a State Department press release. See supra note 158 and
accompanying text. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d
875, 883 (2d Cir. 1981), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied in
part on communications written for the First National case. In Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 594 F. Supp. 1553 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the
court held that it may, "as a matter of discretion, accept the views of the State Depart-
ment as communicated in any public utterance, whether it be in this case, other litiga-
tion, or as a public pronouncement" as justification for not applying the Act of State
Doctrine. Id. at 1563-64.
167. See cases supra note 166.
168. Monroe Leigh, Decision: Act of state doctrine-counterclaims- "Bernstein
letter," 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 458, 460 (1985).
169. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
170. Compare, Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ("courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within
its own territory") with the Estrada Doctrine, supra text accompanying note 67, which
provided the intellectual underpinning for the Carter Doctrine (stating that traditional
recognition practice "implies that judgment of some sort may be passed upon the inter-
nal affairs of those nations by other governments").
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D. Judicial Deference as a Troubling Phenomenon
The Bernstein exception to the Act of State Doctrine and the dis-
positive influence of Statements of Interest in recent recognition cases
demonstrate a broad and deep judicial desire to take instruction from
the executive on foreign affairs. This is rather troubling and, as one
scholar suggests:
Since no other branch has the authority to exercise the judicial
power, practices that permit the Executive to exercise unilateral
decision-making authority in particular court cases may be in-
consistent with the constitutional plan. On its face, the Consti-
tution does not exclude or limit the courts' authority in cases or
controversies touching on foreign relations. Furthermore, mat-
ters with foreign relations implications may involve the legal
rights and duties of individuals under federal law clearly within
the courts' authority. Judicial deference or abstention in such
cases may compromise the authority of the federal courts.171
In sustaining the power of the executive to offer a Statement of
Interest in a foreign affairs case that also implicated one litigant's First
Amendment rights, the Second Circuit suggested that the Department
of State consider adopting a type of informal hearing procedure in or-
der to hear all sides before intervening in a case."' The court recom-
mended that the government consider seriously whether the rights of
the United States are in such jeopardy as to merit executive branch
action in private litigation.173 This approach apparently did not occur
to either the court or the government in Liberia, Ronair, or National
Petrochemical.
One former State Department official noted that the Office of Le-
gal Advisor is fully aware of the implications of involving itself in pri-
vate actions."7 Professor Bilder, who was in the Legal Advisor's office,
wrote:
The considerations that bear on the Office's decisions in
these respects probably include the following: on the one hand,
171. Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 98, 100 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990).
172. International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 409 n.6 (2d Cir. 1963).
173. Id.
174. Richard B. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Advisor: The State Department
Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633, 678 (1962).
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since decisions of the courts or administrative agencies involv-
ing foreign affairs or international law vitally affect the Depart-
ment's responsibilities in the field of foreign relations, the Office
has a clear duty to see that any such decisions are made by the
courts only after full exposure to, and careful study of, all the
various factual, policy and legal considerations involved .... On
the other hand, the Office is reluctant to take any action which
might be construed as an attempt to interfere with or intrude
upon the independence of such courts and agencies and is sensi-
tive to the possible charges that it is taking sides in a private
dispute or exerting its official weight unfairly. In addition, in-
tervention, even at the request of the court, carries the risk of at
least seeming to commit the Department to a particular posi-
tion internationally, and may create considerable embarrass-
ment for the Department if the court does not accept its
view. 175
Current practice with regard to recognition decisions demonstrates
that Professor Bilder's concerns are real but ignored by the judiciary
and executive. In the three recent cases, Liberia, Ronair, and National
Petrochemical, each court had the capacity to arrive at the same deci-
sion without forcing the Department of State to intervene. Yet in each
case, the Department made a Statement of Interest that can be con-
strued by the parties as tantamount to formal recognition, effectively
rendering null and void the non-recognition policy for those particular
governments and countries. Ultimately, and most importantly, each
case gave the executive yet another significant inroad into the province
of the judiciary without any critical assessment by the courts of the
executive's role. The courts have invoked the doctrine of separation of
powers with one breath, while helping to violate it with the next. 176
175. Id.
176. Justice Powell expressed this concern in his concurring opinion in First Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). In rejecting the "Bernstein exception" to the Act of State Doctrine, discussed at
supra part IV.C., Justice Powell wrote: "I would be uncomfortable with a doctrine
which would require the judiciary to receive the Executive's permission before invoking
its jurisdiction. Such a notion, in the name of the doctrine of separation of powers,
seems to me to conflict with that very doctrine." First National is discussed in detail at
supra notes 161-166 and accompanying text.
In his dissenting opinion in First National, Justice Brennan reviewed a case in
which the Court ignored a statement by the Department of State that might otherwise
have been decisive.
In Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), this Court struck down an Ore-
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The United Kingdom has taken an approach to recognition that is
very similar to that of the United States with one major exception-the
government will not state whether or not a state has standing to sue in
U.K. courts. It leaves that decision to the courts.
V. RECOGNITION PRACTICE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Perhaps not surprisingly, the law and practice of recognition in the
United Kingdom has developed along doctrinal lines similar to that in
the United States.1"' Prior to 1980, the law of the United Kingdom
clearly described the legal status of an unrecognized government:
A foreign government which has not been recognized by the
United Kingdom government as either de jure or de facto gov-
ernment has no locus standi in the English courts. Thus it can-
not institute an action in the courts .... The English courts will
not give effect to the acts of an unrecognized government
"'178
Case law also has amplified the intent of this statement in a fash-
ion now familiar to readers of this Note. The judiciary felt an obliga-
tion not to compromise the executive's conduct, stating that the judici-
ary and executive must speak with "one voice".1 79 The opinion of the
Government of the United Kingdom regarding the status or existence
of a state or government was conclusive."' 0
gon escheat statute as an unconstitutional invasion of the National Govern-
ment's power over external affairs, despite advice from the Executive that the
law did not unduly interfere with the conduct of our foreign policy. Para-
phrasing from what my Brother Stewart said there, id., at 443 (concurring
opinion), we must conclude here:
"Resolution of so fundamental [an] issue [as the basic division of
functions between the Executive and the Judicial Branches] cannot
vary from day to day with the shifting winds at the State Depart-
ment. Today, we are told, [judicial review of a foreign act of state]
does not conflict with the national interest. Tomorrow it may."
Id. at 792 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177. See JAFFE, supra note 149, at 124.
178. 18 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1431 (4th ed. 1977). The editors of
the HALSBURY'S are also aware of the similarities in the practices of the United King-
dom and the United States. In the notes immediately following the statement of the
law, they cite many U.S. cases.
179. The Arantzazu Mendi, S.S. v. Government of the Republic of Spain, [1931]
App. Cas. 256, 264 (per Lord Atkin).
180. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd., [1967] 1 App. Cas. 853, 901.
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Like the United States, the United Kingdom has adopted a new
policy regarding the recognition of foreign governments. In two Parlia-
mentary answers in April and May of 1980, the United Kingdom an-
nounced a policy strikingly similar to that of the United States.
[W]e have decided that we shall no longer accord recognition
to governments.
Where an unconstitutional change of regime takes place in
a recognized state, governments of other states must necessarily
consider what dealings, if any, they should have with the new
regime, and whether and to what extent it qualifies to be
treated as the government of the state concerned.
[W]e shall continue to decide in the nature of our dealings with
regimes which come to power unconstitutionally in the light of
our assessment of whether they are able of themselves to exer-
cise effective control of the territory of the State concerned, and
seem likely to continue to do so.
In future cases ...our attitude will be left to be inferred
from the nature of the dealings, if any, which we may have
with it, and in particular on whether we are dealing with it on a
normal government to government basis. 8'
Like the United States, the United Kingdom found that "recog-
nized" new regimes often perceived recognition as a sign of approval. 8 '
One commentator has noted that the effect of the change would be
similar to that proposed in this Note. Courts which are faced with the
question of recognizing acts of an entity alleged to be sovereign will
make decisions based on evidence and interpretation. 83 The commenta-
tor added that it will be "less a matter of executive direction."1 8 This
is the essential difference between British and American practice.
A. The Ciskei Case
An early case which noted this new policy was Gur Corp. v. Trust
181. H.L. Debates, vol. 48, cols. 1121-1122, 28 Apr. 1980; H.C. Debates, vol.
983, Written Answers, cols. 277-279, 25 Apr. 1980 and H.C. Debates, vol. 985, Writ-
ten Answers, col. 385, 23 May 1980 (as quoted in Somalia v. Woodhouse Drake &
Carey, S.A., 3 W.L.R. 744, 751-52 (Q.B.D. 1992)).
182. Somalia, 3 W.L.R. at 752.
183. Dixon, supra note 81, at 558.
184. Id. at 557.
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Bank of Africa, Ltd."8 5 In Gur, the plaintiffs had contracted to con-
struct a hospital and two schools in the Republic of Ciskei, a homeland
set up as an independent state by the Republic of South Africa. 186 Af-
ter the deal went afoul, Gur brought suit against several parties includ-
ing the Republic of Ciskei.' 87
The new policy was not dispositive in this case because the ques-
tion really regarded recognition of a new state, not a new government;
however, the case is instructive because of the attitude of the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (Foreign Office). The Judge himself raised
the issue of Ciskei's standing to sue or be sued in an English court. 88
He and one of the parties submitted questions to the Foreign Office
regarding the status of Ciskei.' 89 The answers reflected that Her Maj-
esty's Government did not recognize Ciskei as an independent state, 90
and that it had no dealings with its government.' 9'
They also asked the Foreign Office if it would "be contrary to the
policy or attitudes of Her Majesty's Government for the English courts
to recognise" the Government of Ciskei for the purposes of being sued
or suing in the respect of its commercial obligations. 9 ' The Foreign
Office answered that the court would have to determine the answer to
that question itself with regard to British policy regarding recognition
and with regard to the government's statement about its own relations
with Republic of Ciskei.' 93 They wrote that "it would not be appropri-
ate for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to answer [this] ques-
tion."' 94 In other words, the Government was giving meaning to the
statement that "our attitude will be left to be inferred from the nature
of the dealings" with a particular government. 95 The courts would
have to decide the jurisdictional issue for themselves based on objective
185. 3 W.L.R. 583, 587 (Q.B.D. 1986).
186. Id. at 585.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 595.
189. Id. at 587.
190. Id. at 588.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 597.
193. Id.
194. Id. In the end, the Court of Appeal decided that Ciskei did have standing as
an instrumentality of another recognized state with which the British government had
relations, South Africa. Id. at 602.
One scholar criticized this decision stating that the court violated the U.K.'s Act
of State Doctrine. Had the court adhered to that doctrine, it would have been pre-
cluded from effectively declaring null and void the South African Act creating Ciskei
as a separate entity. See Dixon, supra note 81.
195. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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evidence because the Foreign Office would not determine the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of the United Kingdom.
B. The Somalia Case
Somalia v. Woodhouse Drake & Carey, S.A. 196 is the first case
which really deals with the effect of the 1980 policy change. Its facts
are also surprisingly similar to those of the Liberia case.
In January 1991, as an uprising was taking place in her country,
the Somali ambassador to the United Nations, an appointee of the gov-
ernment of Mohammed Siad Barre,197 purchased a shipment of rice to
be sent to Somalia. 98 Upon arrival at Mogadishu, the Somali capital,
the ship's captain refused to enter port because of the fighting that
raged in the capital.199 A judge ordered the cargo sold and the proceeds
placed with the court.2 "
Meanwhile, the government of Siad Barre was overthrown by an
alphabet soup coalition of clan-based insurgent forces.201 Various parts
of the country were in the hands of these guerrilla movements and con-
trol over Mogadishu was being contested by two rival factions of the
United Somali Congress; one led by General Mohammed Farah Aidid
and another led by Ali Mahdi Mohammed. 0 At a conference in Dji-
bouti bringing together neighboring states, international organizations,
other interested parties203 and most, but not all of the Somali factions
(General Aidid did not attend), Mr. Mahdi was named provisional
President of the Somali Republic.20 4 An Interim Government also was
named and given a mandate to restore peace and democracy in
Somalia. 205 A Mr. Qalib was named Prime Minister, but perhaps re-
flecting the uncertainty of the times, he based himself in a hotel in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.20
In the name of the Interim Government, Mr. Qalib retained coun-
196. 3 W.L.R. 744, 755 (Q.B.D. 1992).
197. Id. at 746.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. The United Kingdom did not have a representative, though it might be said
to have been represented by the European Economic Community representative in at-
tendance. See id. at 747.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 747-48.
206. Id. at 748.
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sel in the United Kingdom to intervene in the case in order to secure
the proceeds of the sale of the rice.20 7 The former ambassador to the
United Nations also tried to intervene in the name of her now defunct
government. 08 The ambassador's request was not granted as her gov-
ernment no longer existed. 0 9 It was clear, however, that the money
belonged to the Republic of Somalia;21 0 the only question was whether
the Interim Government could properly be held to be the government
of that country and have the capacity to hire lawyers to represent the
Republic in a court in the United Kingdom.21'
As in the Gur 1 2 case, several inquiries were made of the Foreign
Office regarding the nature of British relations with Somalia and the
Interim Government." In the first answer, the government explained
that Somalia was a country riven by civil war and that two significant
factions, including one that controlled the capital, did not recognize the
Interim Government. 214 In subsequent letters, the government contin-
ued to state that there was no government in the country, even refer-
ring to the Interim Government as a mere faction. 215 The government
also reaffirmed the stated policy of not recognizing governments. 2 6
Counsel for the Interim Government argued that the Interim Gov-
ernment should be recognized because it was set up by the Djibouti
agreement.1 ' The court answered that since the Djibouti agreement
207. Id.
208. Id. at 749.
209. Id. at 749-50 ("[I]t is clear that she has no diplomatic status in the United
Kingdom and has no recognition from Her Majesty's Government as a representative
of the Republic of Somalia in this country."). This is one difference between this case
and the Liberia case. This Note has commented earlier that the Liberian ambassador
who represented the Doe government, also represented the Sawyer government. See
supra notes 17, 18 and accompanying text. In the Somalia case, the issue of the am-
bassador did not bear the same significance that this Note argues that it should have
borne in the Liberia decision. See supra notes 132-140 and accompanying text.
210. Somalia, 3 W.L.R. at 750.
211. Id. at 751.
212. Gur Corp. v. Trust Bank of Africa Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 583 (Q.B.D. 1986). See
supra part V.A.
213. Id. at 753-55.
214. Id. at 753.
215. Id. at 754. In one letter that was written after the Djibouti conference, the
Foreign Office wrote: "[l1t is very difficult to judge, for the purposes of your case, who
is the Government of Somalia." Id. at 753. The British Government apparently did not
feel that the conference changed anything. See id. at 753-54.
216. Id. at 753 ("The question of whether to recognize the purported 'interim
government' in Mogadishu thus does not arise for us.").
217. Id. at 756.
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did not represent a constitutional transfer of power, the only way the
Interim Government could be seen as a legitimate government was by
demonstrating that it was "exercising administrative control" over the
country. 21
8
The court also rejected the argument that the Interim Government
was legitimate by virtue of the fact that it was recognized by other
countries and by the United Nations. 21" The court, noting that it is
"difficult to separate recognition of a state from the recognition of the
government of that state," stated that the Interim Government was un-
able to fulfill one of the Montevideo Convention's22O requirements for
the definition of a state, "capacity to enter into relations with other
states." '221 The court conceded that international recognition is a rele-
vant factor,222 but it emphasized as more important its lack of constitu-
tional creation and lack of administrative control. 22 3 Furthermore, in-
ternational recognition of the Interim Government seemed tenuous at
best.224
Eventually, the court decided upon a series of criteria by which to
determine if an entity purporting to be a government should be granted
locus standi in an English court.
[T]he factors to be taken into account in deciding whether a
government exists as the government of a state are: (a) whether
it is the constitutional government of the state; (b) the degree,
nature and stability of administrative control, if any, that it of
itself exercises over the territory of the state; (c) whether Her
Majesty's Government has any dealings with it and if so what
is the nature of those dealings; and (d) in marginal cases, the
extent of international recognition that it has as the government
of the state.225
Based on these criteria, the court held that the Interim Government did
not qualify as a government of Somalia and that it had no authority to
218. Id. ("[A] loss of control by a constitutional government may not immediately
deprive it of its status, whereas an insurgent regime will require to establish control
before it can exist as a government.")
219. Id.
220. Supra note 69, 49 Stat. at 3097.
221. Somalia, 3 W.L.R. at 756. See also Montevideo Convention, supra note 69,
art. 1., 49 Stat. at 3100.
222. Somalia, 3 W.L.R. at 756.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 757.
225. Id.
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hire an English law firm to act on behalf of the Republic of Somalia in
an English court of law.226
This formulation is infinitely more satisfying and conceptually ac-
ceptable than that of the American courts. In the first place, and most
importantly, the court gives due regard to the opinions of the British
Government without depending on a decision by the government re-
garding a jurisdictional matter. If the Foreign Office had stated that it
was maintaining relations with Mr. Qalib, or that he was firmly in con-
trol of the country, the court would likely have granted standing to the
Interim Government. 221 The Liberia court did not appear to be inter-
ested in anything but the State Department's opinion on standing.228
By the same token, the court made it clear that it would not ac-
cept the statements of the Foreign Office as dispositive.
Once the question for the court becomes one of making its own
assessment of the evidence, making findings of fact on all the
relevant evidence placed before it and drawing the appropriate
legal conclusion, and is no longer a question of simply reflecting
government policy, letters from the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office become merely part of the evidence in the case.229
The court also gave due regard to the objective facts of the Somali
situation. The country was torn apart and not under the control of any
government. As we have seen, control by a government is an essential
element of statehood. 230
Using these criteria, the Liberia case might not have turned out
226. Id.
227. Where Her Majesty's Government is dealing with the foreign govern-
ment on a normal government to government basis as the government of the
relevant foreign state, it is unlikely in the extreme that the inference that the
foreign government is the government of that state will be capable of being
rebutted and questions of public policy and considerations of the interrelation-
ship of the judicial and executive arms of government may be paramount. ...
But now that the question has ceased to be one of recognition, the theoretical
possibility of rebuttal must exist.
Id. at 755 (citations omitted).
228. Liberia v. Bickford, 787 F. Supp. 397, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The court may
well have asked about the nature of U.S. relations with Liberia, choosing not to discuss
this in its opinion. Even if this is so, it further demonstrates the court's undue concen-
tration on the wrong issue-whether the State Department thought the Interim Gov-
ernment should be granted standing.
229. Somalia, 3 W.L.R. at 754.
230. See Montevideo Convention, supra note 69, 49 Stat. at 3097 and accompa-
nying text.
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any differently. The United States would still have been able to express
its support for the Interim Government, which the court might still
have felt duty-bound to accept. On the other hand, the court would
have been forced to note the uncertain political situation in Liberia and
the government's continued lack of administrative control. The court
would have been forced to give a more considered holding. Under any
circumstance, it could have avoided inviting executive fiat in a judicial
matter.
VI. CONCLUSION
The new non-recognition doctrine has given the courts an opportu-
nity to formulate a decisional process that can be sensitive to the for-
eign policy requirements of the United States while ensuring some pre-
dictability in its procedures. True, the situation is not dire; it has been
a long time since a U.S. court denied standing to any national party in
a reported case. Still, the judiciary's reaction to the new situation is
slightly distressing. Rather than applying a measure of intellectual
rigor in the interests of continued respect for the courts' jurisdiction,
the courts have turned to the State Department for orders. They have
justified this dependence by citing a longstanding judicial deference to
the executive in foreign policy matters, with little thought to when this
deference is appropriate and when it is not appropriate.
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